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WITHDRAWAL OF APPOINTED COUNSEL FROM
FRIVOLOUS INDIGENT APPEALS
Frivolous indigent appeals present peculiar problems for the court-
appointed attorney. An attorney confronted with an indigent appeal he
believes to be frivolous is also faced with the duty to represent the indi-
gent. The attorney has a duty not to waste the court's time with frivolous
issues, yet he also has a duty to ensure that the indigent receives repre-
sentation consistent with constitutional standards. Existing and proposed
strategies for safeguarding both professional ethics and indigents' rights
on appeal appear either unworkable or inefficacious. This note traces the
development of existing procedures and suggests an alternative which
would comport with the dictates of equal protection and with the attor-
ney's ethical responsibilities of both court and client.
The number of criminal appeals to already overburdened courts has
grown substantially in recent years.' A significant part of this increase
is due to greater accessibility of the appellate procedure to indigents who,
prior to a number of recent United States Supreme Court decisions,' were
too poor to afford appellate review. Because of the "free" appeals now
available to these defendants under the equal protection clause, in some
cases courts have been confronted with appeals that present frivolous is-
sues for review from indigents who have "nothing to lose"8 by appealing.
Indeed, Mr. Justice Clark suggested that "the overwhelming percentage
of in forma pauperis appeals are frivolous." 4  If this perception is sub-
stantially correct, the problem which confronts the judicial system is how
to ensure equal opportunities for indigent and nonindigent defendants
1. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS, pt. 1, § 1.1, at 20; pt. 1, § 1.2, at 25 (Ap-
proved Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; Carrington, Crowded Dock-
ets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National
Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 545, 578 (1969) (approximately 200% increase in the numn-
ber of criminal appeals from federal district courts from 1959-60 to 1966-67) ; ADMINIs-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 97(1972) (24.5% increase in the volume of criminal appeals between 1971 and 1972);
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 102-
03 (1971) (table 4) (52.4% increase in the number of criminal appeals from 1968 to
1971).
2. Most notable cases in the trend are Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967) ;
Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ;
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962) ; Eskridge v. Washington State Bd., 357
U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See note 9 infra.
3. Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 701, 702 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Hermann].
4. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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without permitting or encouraging indigent defendants to use these op-
portunities to make frivolous5 appeals.
In the middle of this tension between an indigent defendant's equal
right to appellate review and the possibility of abuse and overloaded
dockets stands the indigent's appointed attorney. Appointed counsel must
balance the potentially conflicting duties to represent vigorotsly the in-
digent while not presenting frivolous arguments to the court. In addi-
tion, refusal to argue an appeal may deprive the indigent of an opportunity
to appeal equal to that of a nonindigent; refusal to recognize an argu-
ment's frivolousness may provide the defendant another type of unequal
opportunity and waste the court's time.
EQUAL PROTECTION
The United States Supreme Court's decisions in the area of indigent
appeals mandate that "the indigent receive substantially the same assist-
ance of counsel as one who can afford to retain an attorney of his choice. '
What is required are equal opportunities, not equal strategies for achieving
them. For example, few would argue that a nonindigent should receive
court-appointed counsel simply because indigents can. What is required
is a system for indigents which most closely approximates the opportuni-
ties of nonindigents.7 In terms of access to appellate counsel, this system
is easily constructed by appointing counsel. In terms of opportunity to
press frivolous and nonfrivolous appeals, the considerations are more
complex.
A nonindigent defendant must pay for an appeal. Thus, economics
may play a role in accepting an attorney's evalution that a potential ap-
5. For an attempt to define the meaning of "frivolous," see Hermann, supra note
3, at 705-08.
6. Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972), interpreting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
7. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence." During the past forty years the Supreme Court has recognized,
and gradually extended through the fourteenth amendment, the sixth amendment right
to counsel for indigent criminal defendants in both federal and state trials. The scope
of the indigent's rights on appeal likewise has been undergoing a gradual extension. Its
bounds are not yet well-defined. Relying upon the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court, beginning in Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956), has attempted to define the indigent's right of access to appellate
courts to ensure the substantial equality of treatment of indigents with nonindigents by
eliminating procedural discriminations against an appellant because of his poverty. Thus,
the Court has determined that substantial equality requires states to provide free tran-
scripts to indigents, id., and to waive normal filing fees. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708(1961) ; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). Additionally, consistent with the line of
cases beginning with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), recognizing the importance
of counsel, the Court, in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), interpreted equal
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peal is frivolous and should not be taken. An indigent has no such deter-
rent. A nonindigent can seek a second legal opinion when initial counsel
finds the appeal frivolous. An indigent cannot. Finally, some commen-
tators have suggested that indigents receive relatively poor representa-
tion at trial.' If this observation is correct, then indigents may find them-
selves represented on appeal by counsel who created 'the need for appeal.'
Nonindigents, however, have the opportunity to select new counsel for
appeal if dissatisfied with trial counsel." Thus, in the area of frivolous
appeals, the theoretical concept of equal protection poses difficulties in the
construction of a system for achieving equal opportunities.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes a general duty
of attorneys to represent indigents: it creates a presumption against al-
lowing withdrawal of appointed counsel by providing that counsel shall
be excused only for "compelling reasons."" Further, a compelling rea-
son does not include the attorney's belief that the indigent is guilty.'
protection to require the assistance of appointed counsel on a first appeal where the ap-
peal was granted as of right by the state. This right was reaffirmed in Swenson v.
Bosler, 386 U.S. 258 (1967). Similar requirements were imposed on federal courts of
appeals by earlier decisions. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962), and
Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964), required that the indigent be furnished a
trial transcript in certain circumstances. Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957),
and Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958), required the appointment of counsel.
In Johnson the Court held that in federal courts an indigent must be afforded counsel on
appeal when he challenges a certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith. In
Ellis the Court held that federal courts must honor the indigent's request for assistance
regardless of what they think the merits of the request may be.
In Ellis the Court also established standards defining the quality of representation
required on appeal when it held that the indigent's attorney is to function not as a pas-
sive friend of the court, but as an active advocate for his client's cause. Id. at 675.
8. See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 3, at 715-16.
9. Some jurisdictions compel trial counsel to represent the indigent on appeal;
others adopt procedures that strongly urge it. See Hermann, supra note 3, at 709-10.
The ABA recommends that trial counsel remain through appeal. ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 1, at § 2.2. For a discussion of the issue and a sampling of jurisdictions with
court rules requiring continued representation on appeal, see id. at 49-51.
10. This note does not deal with the critical problem of competency of appointed
counsel. Perhaps many indigent appeals could be avoided by proper representation by
counsel at trial. See note 75, infra.
11. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-29. The oath of attorneys
in Indiana contains the promise: "I will not counsel or maintain any action, proceeding,
or defense which shall appear to me to be unjust, but this obligation shall not prevent me
from defending a person charged with crime in any case." Admission & Discipline R. 22,
IND. ANN. STAT. Ct. R. A.D. 22 (Code ed. 1973).
12. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-29. ABA CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETrncs No. 4 does not help in explaining what constitutes a "compelling rea-
son." It merely provides that "[a] lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner
ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason . . . ." Thus a compelling reason
appears to be a reason that is not trivial.
WITHDRAWAL OF APPOINTED COUNSEL
Despite the duty to represent indigents, the Code specifically allows
for withdrawal from a case when a client "[i]nsists upon presenting a
claim or defense that . . cannot be supported by good faith argu-
ment . . . .,1" Additionally, the Code provides that "a lawyer is not
justified in asserting a position in litigation that is frivolous."' 4 Dis-
ciplinary rules are prescribed for attorneys who make such arguments."5
These seemingly competing interests in the Code provisions can be
reconciled. A difference exists between assuring that a client whom one
believes guilty is afforded a fair trial and adjudication and offering frivo-
lous arguments on that client's behalf on appeal. The duty to represent an
indigent whom the attorney believes guilty does not require advancing a
frivolous argument on his' behalf. This is the same duty owed to in-
digents and nonindigents alike. 7
To be consistent with ethical considerations the judicial system
should recognize the right of an attorney to petition to withdraw when
an indigent client insists upon prosecution of an appeal the attorney in
good faith considers -to be frivolous. However, the system must be care-
ful in establishing a procedure for withdrawal. The established pro-
cedure must ensure representation of the indigent consistent with the de-
mands of equal protection.
CURRENT STRATEGIES
Because of the availability of "free" appeals the likelihood is in-
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-110(C) (1) (a). Similarly,
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 44 provides that ". . . if [the client] per-
sists over the attorney's remonstrance in presenting frivolous defenses, . . . the lawyer
may be warranted in withdraving . .. .
14. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-4. Justice Burger, in his
concurring opinion in Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1966) agreed
that the role of an advocate "does not require nor warrant . . . advancing absurd or
legally frivolous contentions." Id. at 846. An attorney is permitted to represent a client
only "so long as he does not thereby knowingly assist the client . ..to take a frivolous
legal position." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-5.
15. In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by
good faith argument ....
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A) (2).
[A] lawyer may not request permission to withdraw . . . unless such re-
quest or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client:
(a) Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not war-
ranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good
faith argument . ...
Id. DR 2-110 (C) (1) (a).
16. The possessive pronoun "his" refers to the person, whether male or female.
17. All provisions of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY apply equally
to all potential clients. See notes 12-16 stupra & text accompanying.
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creased that courts will be called upon to hear disputes in which an in-
digent wishes to appeal a decision on grounds the appointed counsel thinks
frivolous. In response to these disputes, courts have developed a variety
of methods to determine whether the attorney should be allowed to with-
draw. Most of these strategies fail to provide either assurance of a fair
deterniination of the merit of the appeal or adequate and equal represen-
tation for indigents and nonindigents.
No-Merit Letters
In 1964 California adopted a "no-merit" letter procedure in In re
Nash."" Nash held that if an appointed attorney thoroughly studies the
trial record and concludes, after consultation with the defendant and trial
counsel, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, he should so advise
the court by a short "no-merit" letter. If the appellate court is satisfied
from its own review of the record that counsel's conclusion is correct,
withdrawal is permitted and the appeal proceeds without appointment of
another attorney and without argument. The appeal is evaluated solely
on the basis of the record and the indigent's optional pro se brief.
Because the California procedure did not "comport with fair pro-
cedure and lack[ed] the equality that is required by the Fourteenth
Amendment,"19 the United States Supreme Court invalidated it in Angers
v. California.2" The Court declared the no-merit letter both lacked infor-
mation on which the Court could rely and failed to adequately protect the
18. 61 Cal. 2d 491, 39 Cal. Rptr. 205, 393 P.2d 405 (1964).
19. 386 U.S. at 741-42. On the importance of equal treatment the Court quoted
both Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). From Griffin the Court reiterated that equal justice is "not afforded an indi-
gent appellant where the nature of the review 'depends on the amount of money he
has . . . .'" 386 U.S. at 741, quoting Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. Later, the Court recalled
its statement in Douglas that procedures are invalid
where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of argu-
ments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary de-
termination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.
386 U.S. at 741, quoting Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358.
On the importance of counsel to a fair procedure the Court cited the oft-quoted
phrase from Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) that
in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.
20. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In A.zders, the petitioner was convicted of possession of
marijuana. The counsel appointed on appeal concluded there was no merit to the appeal,
and was permitted to withdraw after filing a no-merit letter. The petitioner then pro-
ceeded to file a pro se brief. Predictably, the District Court of Appeal affirmed the
conviction. People v. Anders, 167 Cal. App. 2d 65, 333 P.2d 854 (1959). Six years
later, petitions for habeas corpus to both the District Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court of California were denied. 386 U.S. at 740-41.
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indigent in presenting only the attorney's statement that the appeal was
frivolous." No arguments were required on behalf of the client. Indeed,
Anders noted that the requirements of Ellis v. United States,22 concerning
the duty to represent indigents, were not satisfied by the California pro-
cedure. "Counsel should, and can with honor and without conflict, be of
more assistance to his client and to the court."23
The Anders Brief
In an attempt to remedy these problems, the Court in Anders out-
lined a procedure for attorney withdrawal. The procedure requires the
attorney to accompany a request to withdraw with
a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. A copy of counsel's brief should be furnished
the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he
chooses; the court-not counsel-then proceeds, after a full ex-
amination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is
wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant counsel's request
to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal require-
ments are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if
state law so requires.24
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Black
and Harlan, criticized the suggested procedure because, inter alia, if any
arguable issues existed, the attorney would not be seeking to withdraw
in the first place 5 The dissenters argued:
The quixotic requirement imposed by the Court can be ex-
plained . . . only upon the cynical assumption that an appointed
21. 386 U.S. at 742-43, 745.
22. 356 U.S. 674 (1958). See note 9 supra. Anders noted:
The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can
only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf
of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. The no-merit letter and the
procedure it triggers do not reach that dignity.
386 U.S. at 744.
23. 386 U.S. at 744. The no-merit procedure "afford[ed] neither the client nor
the court any aid," and forced the indigent to "shift entirely for himself while the court
has only the cold record which it must review without the help of an advocate." Id. at
745.
24. 386 U.S. at 744. The requirement thus imposed on the states is similar to thit
recognized earlier in some federal courts. Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., concurring); Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
25. 386 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The commentary to the ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 78, notes that the Anders requirements contain an "apparent
inconsistency." They require the applying attorney to "brief the unbriefable."
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lawyer's professional representation . in a "no-merit" letter
is not to be trusted."
The majority argued that the procedure established would produce
more careful scrutiny of the indigent's claim of nonfrivolousness:
It would also induce the court to pursue all the more vigorously
its own review because of the ready references not only to the
record, but also to the legal authorities as furnished it by coun-
sel.2
7
This argument ignores the realities of the situation. The Court is left to
rely on a brief prepared by an attorney who believes the appeal is frivo-
lous. No brief actively supporting the indigent's position is submitted.
Although the Anders brief is supposedly supportive of the defendant's in-
terest in appeal, when the attorney requests withdrawal he is implicitly
telling the court that the issues raised in the brief to support the client's
position are untenable. In reality, the brief is against the attorney's cli-
ent.28 It is difficult to conceptualize how an attorney can be an active
advocate for the reversal of his client's conviction yet simultaneously file
a motion to withdraw. Moreover, an attorney anxious to withdraw
might easily write a brief overlooking many potentially important argu-
ments. 9 Even if the attorney chooses not to file the "schizophrenic mo-
tion to withdraw""0 and remains in the case, his representation may fall
short of the standard of forceful, active advocacy required by the Ellis de-
cision." Thus, Anders fails to provide an effective advocate for the in-
26. 386 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
27. 386 U.S. at 745.
28. Although ostensibly the Anders brief is required to support the client's position,
when the attorney cites facts, legal issues and authorities in a detailed brief of a frivo-
Ions case it will be tantamount to a brief against the client. Hermann, supra note 3, at
711. The only other alternative, a conclusory brief, is condemned by Anders. See also
Comment, Frivolous Appeals and the Minimum Standards Project; Solution or Sur-
render?, 24 U. MIAmi L. Rlv. 95, 110 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Frivolous Appeals];
Note, The Obligation of Appointed Legal Counsel to Represent an Indigent on Appeal, 17
DRAxE L. Ray. 210, 226 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Obligation]. Anders briefs have
turned into briefs against the client in some cases. See, e.g., Suggs v. United States,
391 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Smith v. United States, 384 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1967);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 451 Pa. 69, 301 A.2d 811 (1973).
29. Obligation, supra note 28, at 226. The oversight could be attributable simply
to lack of due diligence. More likely, it could be due to the discretionary omission of
arguably supportive issues by an attorney whose discretion might be influenced by his
interest in withdrawal. See note 70 infra.
30. Doherty, Wolf! Wolf!-The Ramifications of Frivolous Appeals, 59 3. Caxr.
L.C. & P.S. 1, 2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Doherty].
31. Doherty argues:
It is naive to expect that counsel who writes a brief will simultaneously move
to withdraw. The decision invites sophistry; it offers counsel the choice of filing
a schizophrenic motion to withdraw (accompanied by a formal brief opposing
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digent.
Moreover, Anders provides no guidance for a court when it finds the
appeal not frivolous.32 It is possible to read in the opinion an implicit as-
sumption that the attorney whose petition is denied must proceed with the
appeal. The petitioning attorney, however, forced to prosecute an appeal
he believes frivolous, naturally may not be overly enthusiastic in his repre-
sentation. He probably will have forfeited the confidence of the client.
The appellate court may also be prejudiced by having heard the attorney's
earlier arguments on withdrawal.3 Disciplining counsel, by forcing him
the motion), or the alternative of writing the brief and not moving to with-
draw. Human nature will force the selection of the latter alternative. That
will satisfy the form of due process without regard to substance. Thus, the
decision will encourage mediocrity or default.
Id. at 2. See Hermann, supra note 3, at 715-16.
32. Anders may also not provide counsel guidance in determining if a petition to
withdraw is warranted. Some have interpreted Anders as establishing a distinction be-
tween appeals which are frivolous, from which counsel is permitted to wtihdraw, and
those which are without merit, from which counsel is not permitted to withdraw. In
Sanchez v. State, 85 Nev. 95, 98, 450 P.2d 793, 795 (1969) the court called it a "fine
distinction." The ABA Project asserts
[t]he Anders decision thus appears to rest narrowly on the distinction between
complete frivolity and absence of merit. The latter is not enough to support
either a request by counsel to withdraw, nor the granting of that request by
the court.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 77. Hermann, supra note 3, at 705 refers to it as a
"rarefied distinction."
Although there is language in Anders that could be interpreted as having established
such a distinction, 386 U.S. at 743, language later in the opinion blurs it:
[I]f [the court] finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and
therefore not frivolous) it must . . . afford the indigent the assistance of
counsel to argue the appeal.
Id. at 744. Thus merit and frivolity are defined in terms of the absence of the other.
With no workable definition provided by Anders of "wholly frivolous," or how it differs
from "without merit," only confusion can result from an attorney attempting to dis-
tinguish between what he thinks is a frivolous and what he thinks is a meritless appeal.
The problem has led some courts to reject the distinction entirely. See, e.g., Nickols v.
Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1971) (the attorney concluded the appeal had "no
possible merit" instead of concluding it was frivolous. The court nevertheless permitted
withdrawal saying it "attach[es] no constitutional significance to the particular words
[the attorney] used to express his conclusion") ; Cleghorn v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 466, 475,
198 N.W.2d 577, 582 (1972) ("Cleghorn also argues there is a distinction between
'wholly frivolous' and 'without merit.' We think not . . . . We fail to see any dis-
tinction, and there should be none . . . .") ; People v. Sumner, 262 Cal. App. 2d 409,
415, 69 Cal. Rptr. 15, 19-20 (1968) (the court purported to recognize a "vague!' dis-
tinction but went on to note that "some appeals are frivolous for the sole reason that
they simply have no merit whatever." The court concluded that the "difficulty of draw-
ing the line" dictates "that in all but the clearest of cases it should not be used."). Other
courts in attempting to define "frivolous appeal" do so by saying it is one that is devoid
of merit. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Sheets, 483 S.W.2d 783, 785
(Mo. App. 1972); Crook v. Crook, 184 Cal. App. 2d 745, 751, 7 Cal. Rptr. 892, 896
(1960) ; Treat v. State ex rel. Mitton, 121 Fla. 509, 510, 163 So. 883 (1935).
33. See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 3, at 714; Obligation, supra note 28, at 225.
Doherty, supra note 30, at 2 argues mediocrity will result under Anders because some
attorneys might not choose to withdraw even though they believe the case is frivolous.
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to remain, is not a satisfactory method for achieving the Anders goal of
substantial equality for indigent and nonindigent.
Judicial reaction to the Anders procedure has been varied. Most
courts follow it with little, if any, discussion of its merits."4 Some courts
criticize it, but follow it anyway." Others vary the procedure slightly."B
The same argument might apply where the attorney is directly forced to remain by the
court after a denial of a withdrawal petition.
34. See, e.g., Alaska: McCracken v. State, 439 P.2d 448 (1968) ; Arizona: State
v. Ferguson, 20 Ariz. App. 161, 511 P.2d 174 (1973) ; Connecticut: State v. Pascucci,
161 Conn. 382, 288 A.2d 408 (1971) ; Delaware: Smith v. State, - Del. - , 248 A.2d
146 (1968); Florida: Wright v. State, 275 So. 2d 574 (Ct. App. 1973); Georgia:
Chambers v. State, 229 Ga. 648, 193 S.E.2d 816 (1972) ; Illinois: People v. Earl, 14 Ill.
App. 3d 617, 302 N.E.2d 664 (1973) ; Iowa: Walker v. Brewer, - Iowa - , 189
N.W.2d 605 (1971); Kentucky: Fite v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 357 (1971);
Maryland: Robinson v. State, 13 Md. App. 439, 283 A.2d 637 (1971) ; Nebraska: State
v. Kellogg, 189 Neb. 692, 204 N.W.2d 567 (1973); New Hampshire: State v. Fleury,
111 N.H. 294, 282 A.2d 873 (1971); New Jersey: State v. Allen, 99 N.J. Super. 314,
239 A.2d 675 (1968); New Mexico: State v. Franklin, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P2d 982
(1967) ; Ohio: State v. Toney, 23 Ohio App. 2d 203, 262 N.E.2d 419 (1970) ; Oklahoma:
Jewell v. Tulsa County, 450 P.2d 833 (Ct. App. 1969); Oregon: Storms v. Cupp, 13
Ore. App. 273, 508 P.2d 450 (1973); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Anderson,
224 Pa. Super. 391, 307 A.2d 387 (1973) ; Rhode Island: State v. Desroches, 110 R.I.
497, 293 A.2d 913 (1972) ; South Carolina: Williams v. State, 260 S.C. 10, 193 S.E2d
809 (1973); Texas: Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Ct. App. 1969); Vermont:
State v. Kalis, 127 Vt. 311, 248 A.2d 721 (1968); Washington: State v. Haverty, 3
Wash. App. 495, 475 P.2d 887 (1970).
35. Perhaps the most recent and vehement criticism of Anders is from the court in
State v. Romano, 29 Utah 2d 237, 507 P.2d 1025 (1973), where the court alleged:
[Anders) seems to condemn the honorable practitioner and turns the ambulance
siren on for others less scrupulous . . . . The Anders case seems to down-
grade the capabilities of lawyers and question their intelligence.
The Anders case sticks in an honorable, capable lawyer's throat and its
sanctions make it difficult to swallow a morsel difficult to stomach.
Id. at 238, 507 P.2d at 1025. Other courts have been critical as well. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. State, 44 Ala. App. 618, 619, 217 So. 2d 830, 831 (1969) ("Anders . . .
lays down Draconian rules as to when counsel for an indigent defendant may with-
draw . . . ."); Autrey v. State, 44 Ala. App. 53, 60, 202 So. 2d 88, 95 (1967)
(Cates, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1030 ("the intricate and onerous red tape
laid down by the majority opinion in Anderd') ; People v. Brown, 106 Ill. App. 2d 477,
480, 245 N.E.2d 548, 549-50 (1969) (the court says "[the] unfortunate by-product [of
Anders] has been all too frequently to engage court and counsel in a time-consuming
academic exercise in a legal and a factual vacuum. Just how candor of counsel on fac-
tual or legal issues presented by the record should be condemned rather than com-
mended escapes us."); Commonwealth v. McMillan, 212 Pa. Super. 48, 50, 240 A.2d 380,
381 (1968) (the court calls Anders an "extreme example of the attitude of a majority
of the members of the United -States Supreme Court concerning procedure and equality
in appellate representation . .. ").
36. See, e.g., United States v. Camodeo, 383 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (There,
the affidavit accompanying appointed counsel's motion to withdraw contained an exten-
sive summary of the record and set forth legal contentions that could be based on it,
but also explained counsel's reasons for concluding that these possible contentions were
without any basis. Despite this, the court held that the affidavit clearly showed that
counsel had acted as advocate and not as amicus curiae. Additionally, the court held
immaterial the fact that the report was in the form of an affidavit, and not a brief,
saying it would serve no purpose to give to the representation the appearance of ad-
vocacy when the attorney believed the arguments to be wholly frivolous.) See also Bo-
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For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Nickols v. Gagnon" allowed an at-
torney to submit a four-page letter outlining possible legal issues, rather
than a brief. The letter was said to conform to the substantive require-
ments of Anders.
No Withdrawal
The American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal
justice has criticized Anders. 8 It tentatively recommended that attorneys
not be allowed to withdraw from possibly frivolous appeals:
Counsel should not seek to withdraw from a case because of his
determination that the appeal lacks merit.
(i) Counsel should give his client his best professional
estimate of the quality of the case and should endeavor
to persuade the client to abandon a wholly frivolous
appeal, or to eliminate particular contentions that are
lacking in any substance.
-(ii) If the client wishes to proceed, it is better for counsel
to present the case, so long as his advocacy does not
involve deception or misleading of the court . . .
The Project argued that the attorney's task is to advocate, not to judge
the defendant's case.4" Thus, even though the attorney owes a general
duty to the court not to present frivolous claims,4 the Project concluded
that because the attorney
is of greater aid to the court by remaining with a weak or
lick v. State, 127 Ga. App. 542, 194 S.E.2d 302 (1972) (even though appointed counsel
did not submit citations or arguments to the court of appeals, the constitutional require-
ments were satisfied because the court itself carefully reviewed the trial transcript and
gave consideration to all the legal points; the court attempting to justify the procedure
by saying the charge was not complex, and did not involve extensive resdarch) ; Sanchez
v. State, 85 Nev. 95, 450 P.2d 793 (1969) (The court professed to remove some 'of the
circuitous requirements of the Anders case so that litigant, counsel and court can ex-
peditiously get to the point of each case with a minimum of procedural steps. Appointed
counsel is not required to file a withdrawal request. If he believes the appeal to be
frivolous, he must file the opening brief on the merits of all arguable issues to
gether with an acknowledgement that he does not believe there is merit.). See generally
Note, Assistance of Counsel to the Indigent Seeking Leave to Appeal Criminal Convic-
tion-a Michigan Response to Anders v. California, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 239, 243-44
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Assistance] for different procedural interpretations given
Anders.
37. 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
38. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 76-78.
39. Id. at § 3.2.
40. Id. at 75.
41. Id. at 79-80; see notes 12-16 supra & text accompanying.
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groundless appeal than by withdrawing, the preferable position
is for counsel to remain even at some cost to the concept of
professional independence of the attorney.42
After further examination, however, the ABA amended the Project's
tentative standards to allow withdrawal to conform with Anders and with
stricter ethical considerations. 3
However, in Dixon v. State44 the Indiana Court of Appeals adopted
the Project's rationale and joined two other jurisdictions in denying court
appointed attorneys the opportunity to withdraw.45 Although Dixon in-
volved a post-conviction remedy appeal, the court stated that indigents are
entitled to the same standard of advocacy regardless of the stage of the
proceedings.4" It held that the Indiana Public Defender must represent a
petitioner on appeal whenever an adverse decision on a post-conviction
remedy is rendered and the petitioner seeks to appeal.4"
42. Id. at 81-82.
43. Id. at 6 (Supp. 1970). The specific portions of the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RE PONSIBILITY cited by the ABA are Ethical Considerations 2-31, 2-32, 7-5, 7-7, 7-8,
and Disciplinary Rules 2-110 and 7-102. Section 3.2 (b) (ii) now reads:
If the client wishes to proceed, it is better for counsel to present the case,
so long as his advocacy does not involve deception or misleading the court. Af-
ter preparing and filing a brief on behalf of the client, counsel may appropriately
suggest that the case be submitted on briefs or request permission to withdraw.
Id. at 5 (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added).
44. - Ind. App. - , 284 N.E.2d 102 (1972). Prior to Dixon, the Anders case
had been discussed three times in Indiana, none of which bear upon the present discus-
sion. Cline v. State, 253 Ind. 264, 252 N.E.2d 793 (1969) ; Robbins v. State, 251 Ind.
313, 241 N.E.2d 148 (1968) ; State ex rel. Lawrence v. Morgan Circuit Court, 249 Ind.
115, 234 N.E.2d 498 (1967).
45. McClendon v. People, 174 Colo. 7, 481 P.2d 715 (1971); State v. Gates, 466
S.W.24 681 (Mo. 1971). The Dixon court cited the standards proposed in ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 1, at § 3.2, by quoting them from the McClendon decision. These
standards are reproduced at note 39 supra & text accompanying. The Dixon court in-
correctly labelled these standards as being proposed in AMERICAN BAR AssOCATION
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Tent. Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as
ABA FUNCTION].
46. - Ind. App. at -, 284 N.E.2d at 106.
47. While the court claimed only to be interpreting an existing statute, its reason-
ing can only be explained as an attempt to reach a result consistent with the Project's
standards. Rule 1, § 9 of the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies
states: "[T]he Public Defender shall serve as counsel for petitioner, representing him
in all proceedings under this rule, including appeal, if necessary." IND. ANN. STAT. Ct.
R. P.C. 1, § 9 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
The court interpreted the rule as requiring the Public Defender to represent indi-
gents on all post-conviction appeals, no matter how frivolous. It did not have to inter-
pret the rule in such a manner. An alternative interpretation which would be consistent
with Anders is equally possible. The court itself recognized that the words "if necessary"
in the Rule could be interpreted so as to allow the Public Defender to proceed on an ap-
peal at his discretion. In an effort to undercut that interpretation, the court cited Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), where the Supreme Court held that the Indiana Public
Defender's refusal of a client's request for a direct appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court,
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This solution suffers from at least five problems. First, the problem
in Anders of "brief[ing] the unbriefable"' is not avoided. It is merely
changed to "communicating the uncommunicable."' 9  If the attorney felt
because of his belief that an appeal would be unsuccessful, violated the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court objected to the fact that "an indigent can, at the will of the
Public Defender, be entirely cut off from any appeal at all." 372 U.S. at 481. However,
even if Lane undercuts the secondary interpretation suggested by the court, a stronger
interpretation of the words "if necessary" was neglected by the court. The Rule could
be interpreted to allow withdrawal of appointed counsel when an appeal is frivolous. If
an appeal is frivolous, i.e., if there is no hope of success at the appellate level, an appeal
is not "necessary" and appointed counsel should be allowed to withdraw. The decision
on frivolousness, however, could not rest in the sole discretion of the Public Defender
or the appointed counsel as it did in Lane.
In so interpreting Rule 1, § 9, Dixon not only rejected the Anders approach, but
abrogated a long and well-established line of cases in which it had been held that the
Indiana Public Defender was not required to represent indigents on appeal when the
appeal had no merit. For over a century Indiana had guaranteed the assistance of coun-
sel to every defendant in a criminal trial. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854). Much
before Dougias, Indiana courts had extended the guarantee to appeals from a conviction.
State ex rel. White v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E.2d 129 (1941). But the Hilge-
mann case recognized that the right of an indigent to appeal did not give the indigent
a right to present frivolous appeals. Id. at 579, 34 N.E.2d at 131. Numerous Indiana
cases since Hilgenzann had reiterated that the Public Defender is not required to repre-
sent an indigent if, in the Public Defender's opinion, the appeal has no merit. See, e.g.,
In re Lawrence, 248 Ind. 139, 224 N.E.2d 512 (1967) ; In re Harvey, 247 Ind. 23, 210
N.E.2d 859 (1965) ; Willoughby v. State, 242 Ind. 183, 177 N.E.2d 465 (1961), cert. de-
nied, 374 U.S. 832 (1963); McCrary v. State, 24 Ind. 518 173 N'.E.2d 300 (1961);
Brown v. State, 241 Ind. 298, 301, 171 N.F_2d 825, 827 (1961) ("The public defender
is not obliged . . . to make a travesty of his office, by preparing and performing all
the formal requisites of an appeal, when such an appeal would be without meritorious
grounds which he could in good conscience present . . . .") ; State ex rel. Casey v.
Murray, 231 Ind. 74, 106 N.E.2d 911 (1952). The reasoning centered around three
points. Initially, the courts argued that the right to appointed counsel recognized in
Hilgenann did not require the state to waste funds for meritless appeals. See, e.g., Wil-
loughby v. State, 242 Ind. 183, 177 N.E.2d 465 (1961), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 832 (1963).
Secondly, it was argued that equal protection did not require the state to pay for an
appeal against the advice of counsel because a nonindigent defendant, paying for an ap-
peal, would probably choose not to appeal if counsel so advised. Id. at 197, 177 N.E.2d
at 472. Finally, many decisions rested partially on ethical standards and ruled that an
attorney convinced of the frivolousness of the appeal should not be required to violate
his lawyer's oath. See, e.g., In re Harvey, 247 Ind. 23, 210 N.E.2d 859 (1965) ("It is a
violation of an attorney's oath and duty if he attempts to file a frivolous and non-
meritorious appeal." Id. at 24, 210 N.E.2d at 859) ; In re Stillabower, 246 Ind. 695, 210
N.E.2d 665 (1965) ; McCrary v. State, 241 Ind. 518, 173 N.E2d 300 (1961).
The pre-Anders Indiana procedure sanctioned in numerous cases would not satisfy
the Anders requirements today. Much like the Nash procedure, in Indiana representa-
tion was excused when the attorney himself concluded there was no merit to the appeal.
See, e:g., It re Harvey, 247 Ind. 23, 210 N.E.2d 859 (1965) ; McCrary v. State, 241 Ind.
518, 531, 173 N.E2d 300, 306 (1961). This procedure was declared invalid in Anders,
386 U.S. at 742. The overall policy, however, of excusing representation of indigents
in certain situations comports with the policy suggested in Anders.
48. See note 25 srupra & text accompanying.
49. In attempting to solve the dilemma of appointed counsel who, on the one hand,
is to vigorously represent the indigent, yet, on the other, feels any arguments that might
be made are frivolous, the Dixon court recommended the ABA solution, instructing the
attorney to
communicate to the court the issues and whatever can be said in support of
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he could "communicate" to the court issues in good conscience, he would
not be asking to withdraw."
Second, the Project and Dixon ignore the fact that a nonindigent's
attorney must represent to the court that he is making arguments worthy
of the court's attention.5 While an attorney does not have to "endorse
his client's case," 2 his arguments carry some representation that they are
arguable on the merits, not "meaningless charades." 3 The Project, how-
ever, maintains that
appearance of counsel is not an implicit representation to the
court that he believes in the legal substantiality of the conten-
tions advanced. The court should not take absence of a request
to withdraw as any indication of the lawyer's own estimate of
the case.5"'
However, because there is an implicit representation made by the attor-
ney that the arguments are not frivolous in nonindigent cases, if this were
not also the case in indigent appeals, a double standard would develop.5
Third, the Project and Dixon have ignored the dictates of the Code
of Professional Responsibility56 and the rulings of some courts." Under
several Code provisions, attorneys are guilty of a breach of ethics if they
them without . . . advising the court that he is aware of the weakness of the
position.
- Ind. App. at - , 284 N.E.2d at 106, quoting ABA FuNcTioN, supra note 45, at
301. The same instructions are found in ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 82.
50. See note 25 supra & text accompanying.
51. Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972).
If retained counsel are effective advocates and attentive to their profes-
sional responsibilities, they will seldom advance contentions that are ground-
less. The mere fact that such a lawyer is making an argument should indicate
that it has sufficient substance to merit the court's attention.
Id. at 472.
52. Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.,
concurring).
53. Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972).
54. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 82.
55. Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972). The court called the distinction "subtle but invidious," and pointed out 'that if
such a standard developed the indigent would lose the benefit of this implicit representa-
tion. Id. at 472.
56. See notes 12-16, 43, supra & text accompanying.
57. See, e.g., Cleghorn v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 466, 198 N.W.2d 577 (1972).
While an indigent defendant has a constitutional right to assistance of
counsel, he has no right to require an advocate to violate his professional and
personal integrity and oath of office by advancing arguments which he does
not honestly believe have any merit. Counsel does not have to stultify himself
by arguing hopeless and nonmeritorious appeals.
Id. at 476, 198 N.W.2d at 582.
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argue frivolous appeals for indigents or nonindigents. "s Disallowing with-
drawal would inevitably force an attorney to advance arguments he deems
frivolous.
Fourth, by disallowing withdrawal, an important deterrent to the fil-
ing of frivolous appeals is removed. The Project maintains that the
most effective deterrent is lawyer-client counselling. 9 However, concern-
ing the decision as to whether an appeal should be taken, it is difficult to
see how counselling will persuade an indigent not to file a frivolous appeal
when the indigent knows it must be heard upon' his demand. 0
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the quality of appellate advo-
cacy will suffer under the Project and Dixon approach. In an atmosphere
of coercion, where the attorney is forced to argue issues he considers not
arguable, in contravention of professional ethics, the possibility of a su-
perior performance is slight. To the extent that the attorney does not
meet the level of performance he would have attained had he believed in
the "arguability" of the contentions, the Project and Diron also fail to
achieve the subsidiary goal of Anders, assisting the appellate courts in
determining the merits of the appeal.
The Project and Dixon approach does not promote equal protection.
Counsel representing a nonindigent is instructed to withdraw under the
Code of Professional Responsibility if his client insists on a frivolous
appeal. Counsel representing an indigent, however, must continue to re-
present him even when the client insists on an appeal which counsel con-
siders frivolous. The indigent would be allowed to dictate the appeal and
its arguments," a power no nonindigent would possess.
AN ALTERNATIVE: SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL
The past, current, and proposed methods for determining the duties
of counsel confronted with a frivolous appeal contain major drawbacks.
Under one system, counsel is allowed to withdraw after a perfunctory
58. See notes 11-15 supra & text accompanying.
59. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 63.
60. One writer calls this solution "extremely naive." Frivolous Appeals, Moupra note
28, at 105. Hermann agrees, supra note 3, at 720 n.81.
61. While perfecting an appeal dictated by his client, the attorney must compromise
his professional independence, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 81-82, and use argu-
ments the indigent seeks to use regardless of counsel's professional evaluation. To the
extent paying clients would defer to the decision of counsel of their choice, the Project
and Dixon require the attorney to use arguments for the indigent which he would not use
on behalf of a paying client. The Seventh Circuit has rejected any such compulsion be-
cause it is not required by the precepts of equal protection. Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d
467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). The court agreed that indigents
should receive substantially the same assistance. This, the court concluded, does not
mean that Anders requires counsel to "make arguments that he would not consider
worthy of inclusion in a brief submitted on behalf of a paying client." Id. at 471.
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showing that the client's case is frivolous. 2 This method promotes hasty
and careless review of the merits by counsel who wishes not to take an
appeal. It promotes divisiveness between attorney and client. Under a
different approach, counsel is not allowed to withdraw for any reason-
no matter how frivolous he deems the appeal.68 This method promotes
excessive client control over the attorney. It makes the attorney the cli-
ent's officer, not the court's."'
The interests of the judicial system in economy, fairness to the attor-
ney, and equal protection to the indigent, should be more carefully bal-
anced. A method should be developed by which courts can be more cer-
tain of their judgments as to the frivolousness of appeals and the ade-
quacy of the indigents' representation without forcing counsel to violate
ethical requirements. 5 Such a method might entail the use of a "second
opinion" from substitute counsel.
The initial appellate counsel, before being permitted to withdraw,
should be required to file a statement containing a conscientious, profes-
sional memorandum on the appeal, using case references and citations to
legal authorities and theories. Such a statement has been held to meet
62. See text, No-Merit Letters section, supra.
63. See text, No Withdrawal section, supra.
64. Between these extremes lies the Anders brief. The difficulties inherent in that
procedure are discussed in the Anders Brief section supra.
65. The solutions suggested herein assume the desirability of working within the
present appellate structure. More radical changes in the appellate structure itself could
be suggested to deal with the problem of frivolous appeals. Pre-appeal screening for
frivolous cases is a possibility. See generally ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 64-71;
Carrington, supra note 1, at 574-79. Many legal writers feel such a system is undesir-
able as a matter of policy. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 64-71; Hermann,
supra note 3, at 717. Such screening might be a denial of equal protection if done only
in cases of indigents. The Supreme Court has hinted, however, that a procedure for
screening all appeals would not be unconstitutional. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S.
487, 499 (1963). In some jurisdictions, leave to appeal must be granted by the trial
court. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1237.5 (West 1970) (appeals from judgments on
pleas of guilty or nolo contendere); 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1970) (appeals from judgments
in habeas corpus).
In federal courts, in forma pauperis appeals cannot be taken if the trial court cer-
tifies such action is not in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970). All these deter-
minations are reviewable and seem merely to add another step to the procedure. For
a general criticism, see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 68-69.
Penalizing frivolous appeals is another possibility. See, e.g., Hazard, After the Trial
Court-The Realities of Appellate Review, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW
EXPLOSION 60, 84 (Jones ed. 1965). Most seem to reject this approach because it is un-
fair to penalize petitioners for presenting frivolous appeals unless they had foreknowl-
edge that the appeal was frivolous. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 70-72; Her-
mann, supra note 3, at 717; Frivolous Appeals, supra note 28, at 105.
Appellate review of sentences is another possibility explored in several articles.
See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 3, at 720.
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the Anders constitutional requirements."8 Additionally, the statement
should contain an affirmance that the attorney petitioning to withdraw
cannot continue consistent with his professional standards. The court
could then appoint a substitute counsel for the indigent. After a full re-
view of the facts and the appealable issues, the substitute would then take
the appeal if he decided there were meritorious issues to be argued. If
the substitute counsel agreed with the initial counsel that an appeal would
be frivolous, he would then submit his own independent memorandum
similar to that filed by initial counsel. The court could then conduct its
own inquiry."
After the court makes its decision on the merits, its reasons for find-
ing the appeal frivolous or meritorious should be published in a written
opinion. This would give needed instruction to counsel on the particular
court's views of what constitutes a frivolous or meritorious appeal." The
court's opinion could also explain what was right and wrong with the form
of the memoranda it received from counsel, thereby furnishing guidelines
for the future on the type and quantity of information desired.
One of the most important aspects of this approach is that it would
force the initial counsel to appraise carefully the merits of all potential
arguments. Since he would be aware that another attorney would con-
sider the same case, there would be a strong incentive to be certain and
66. Nickols v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925
(1972). Cf. Tate v. United States, 359 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Johnson v. United
States, 360 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
67. In addition to use of substitute counsel with accompanying memoranda, judges
could make greater use of their law clerks to obtain a more thorough and objective view
of the appeal. Although a gross delegation of power to the clerk would be improper,
the procedure could be limited so that the clerk would read the record, make a report
and help determine possible merit in the appeal without making the final decision.
See, e.g., Hermann, supra note 3, at 719. This would help satisfy the Anders require-
ment that the appellate court conduct an independent evaluation of the merits of the case,
386 U.S. at 745, and hopefully help insure completeness in that the clerks could conceiv-
ably find issues overlooked in the counsel's briefs, or aid the court in considering issues
raised by counsel. Such review might also stimulate thoroughness on the part of with-
drawing counsel. Use of clerks in such a fashion is already made in the courts of one
state. See Cleghorn v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 466, 198 N.W.2d 577 (1972); Eisenberg,
No Merit Briefs in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 45 Wis. BAR BULL. 28 (Apr. 1972).
68. See Hermann, supra note 3, at 705, 707-08, 718, 721. Most appellate courts do
not write lengthy opinions detailing their reasons for ruling that an appeal is or is. not
frivolous. Where this practice prevails, there is little possibility for an attorney to tell
what the appellate court considers frivolous. Some courts, however, have recognized the
need for explanatory opinions. See, e.g., Glass v. United States, 405 F.2d 471 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 939 (1969) ; State v. Pascucci, 161 Conn. 382, 387, 288 A.2d
408, 410 (1971) ("while it is unnecessary for the court to state its reason for a decision
that an appeal is 'wholly frivolous,' a memorandum of decision explaining the basis of
the decision of the court would obviously be especially desirable.") ; People v. Carter, 92
I1. App. 2d 120, 235 N.E.2d 382 (1968). CY. United States v. Minor, 444 F.2d 521 (5th
Cir. 1971) (per curiam) ; Suggs v. United States, 391 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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thorough in his research and evaluation.69 Embarrassment could result
from a substitute counsel's determination that an appeal was meritorious,
especially if the appellate court agreed. This approach also recognizes
that attorneys' conceptions of the law and commitments to indigents may
differ.7 An indigent should not be penalized simply because his attorney
has a certain view of the types of arguments which might be meritorious.
A nonindigent can seek a second opinion, or at least has a number of at-
torneys from which to choose. For an indigent, substitute counsel may
provide similar opportunities.
A modified substitute counsel procedure has been used in at least one
instance. In a Michigan case,"' after the appointed attorney had made a
thorough search of the record, analyzed the issues, and determined that no
meritorious grounds for appeal existed, he submitted a three page report
to the court. He refused to pursue the appeal, concluding that "mindful
of [his] oath . . . and . . . canons of professional ethics" it would be
unethical to do so.' Substitute counsel willing to argue the appeal was
appointed. The Supreme Court of Michigan acquitted the initial counsel
of, contempt charges, commended his adherence to what he believed was
ethically compelled, and concluded that
69. Although this pressure exists to a certain extent in an Anders brief, it would
be stronger in a substitute counsel procedure. Because the substitute counsel may have
a different perspective of or interest in a case (see note 70 infra) the review may be
more complete than that given by a court which has a heavy case load and only the
initial attorney's Anders brief to consider.
70. Many times attorneys will have different ideas about what issues are important.
One attorney's "legal technicality" might be another's "cornerstone of the law without
which the entire edifice would crumble." Assistance, supra note 36, at 251 n.85, where
the author used this fact to argue that appellate court guidance in this area is essential.
Appellate guidance is needed, see note 68 supra & text accompanying, but the fact that
lawyers disagree on the importance of many issues is seemingly more supportive of a
"substitute counsel" approach.
Mr. Justice Harlan recognized the merits of a fresh outlook in an analagous situa-
tion in Lane v. Brown when he wrote:
[i]t ignores the human equation not to recognize the possibility that a Public
Defender . . . may decide not to appeal questions which a lawyer who has had
no previous connection with the case might consider worthy of appellate review.
372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963). Unfortunately, a lawyer's workload may also affect his as-
sessment of the merits of an indigent's case. An attorney who is heavily burdened might
tend to view the merits of an indigent's cause more critically than an attorney who has
more time, or who perhaps feels a stronger commitment to the indigent. To the extent
an attorney's private workload or philosophical commitment influences his view of the
possible merit of the indigent's case, substitute counsel might be found who could argue
it in good faith and with effort.
71. In re Hoffmann, 382 Mich. 66, 168 N.W.2d 229 (1969). The court determined
that Anders did not apply to the case because the action complained of had occurred prior
to the decision. But, nevertheless, it discussed Anders and suggested the alternative pro-
cedure. For a discussion in greater detail of the factual complexities of Hoffmann, see
Assistance, supra note 36.
72. 382 Mich. at 86, 168 N.W.2d at 237.
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[a]s against that rule [i.e., Anders] . . . we prefer our
eminently stiperior practice; that of appointing for an indigent
appellant willing or disposed counsel . . . . It provides for
such an appellant a lawyer more likely to serve better than would
the lawyer forced against his will to act for a cause he knows
: * . is frivolous. And, unlike Anders, it certainly assures this
in the appellate court .... "
Certain problems exist with the substitute counsel approach, some of
which are inherent in any system of indigent representation. One writer
has suggested that the substitute counsel approach might fail because the
attorneys likely to attract appointment are those who will comply with the
requirement for representation in form only and will not "take up the
cause anew." 4 Why these attorneys are likely to be appointed is never
explained. There are indications to the contrary. Some courts refuse
to appoint young and inexperienced attorneys to represent the indigent."'
Additionally, if appellate courts were to exercise their power to remove
from the list of lawyers for assignment on appeal those who lack either
competence or diligence, this problem could be further minimized."6 More-
over, this problem is not peculiar to substitute counsel proposals, but is a
weakness in all appointed counsel procedures.
Some fear a substitute counsel procedure may result in prejudice be-
cause the second counsel would be aware that his predecessor felt the case
had no merit.77 It is not clear why the substitute counsel need know of
the initial counsel's opinion. However, if he does know, prejudice will
not necessarily result. The advantage of the procedure is that it allows
the court to appoint an attorney who might disagree with his predecessor
73. Id. at 81-82, 168 N.W.2d at 235. For another example of dissatisfaction over
a procedure which would compel an attorney to violate his ethics, see State v. Cheelester,
26 Utah 2d 300, 488 P.2d 1045 (1971). After receiving a short letter requesting with-
drawal and subsequently granting the request, the Supreme Court of Utah commended
the attorney "for his high standard of ethical and moral principles." Id. at 301, 488 P.2d
at 1046.
74. Assistance, supra note 36, at 250.
75. See, e.g., State v. Toney, 23 Ohio App. 2d 203, 262 N.E.2d 419 (1970). An
Ohio appellate court claimed that "as a matter of policy [they] have long refrained from
the practice of appointing young or inexperienced counsel to represent defendants on
criminal appeals." Id. at 206, 262 N.E.2d at 422.
76. See Hermann, supra note 3, at 716-17.
77. Obligation, supra note 28, at 210 n.1. It might also be argued that courts would
be prejudiced against either the case itself or the attorney arguing it, knowing former
counsel had withdrawn to avoid transgressing ethical standards. Due to the varying
conceptions of "frivolousness" among attorneys, see note 70 supra, courts could avoid
such prejudice by recognizing one counsel's request to withdraw without impugning the
motives of his successor. See, e.g., State v. Cheelester, 26 Utah 2d 300, 488 P2d 1045
(1971).
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on the merits."8
CONCLUSION
The substitute counsel approach could benefit the attorney, the in-
digent, and the court. Because the initial attorney who fulfills the require-
ments will be allowed to withdraw, the attorney need compromise neither
his duties to the court or to his client, nor his professional ethics. An
intelligent, well-researched opinion is more likely if the attorney is not
adverse to court and client."9  Such an opinion will fulfill the requirements
of both fairness and indigent representation. Moreover, the substitute
counsel approach may provide the indigent with a substitute attorney who
believes in the indigent's case and will vigorously argue the appeal.
MICHAEL R. CONNER
78. See note 70 supra & text accompanying. It is not clear how the substitute coun-
sel procedure could possibly be more prejudicial to the indigent than the Project and
Dixon approach of forcing an attorney to represent the indigent even if he thinks the
appeal is frivolous.
79. If the attorney were allowed to withdraw when continued representation would
conflict with his ethical standards, the memorandum of the petitioning attorney could be
more helpful to both client and court. It would be more objective and would not be
written with a view toward convincing the court that the appeal is frivolous merely to
facilitate the attorney's withdrawal, as have some Anders briefs in the past. See note
28 supra. Because the appellate court cannot effectively function without an attorney to
present what can be said on behalf of an indigent, the procedure which allows the attor-
ney to do so in the most objective manner is preferable to a procedure in which ulterior
motives may color his appraisal. Knowing that his withdrawal petition will be granted,
counsel can place before the court all possible facts and relevant authorities necessary
for it to make an informed judgment, in the form of a reasoned analysis and evaluation
based upon all possible points of error. This would be similar to the evaluation made by
a competent retained attorney before he advises his client of the prospects for appeal.
Thus the indigent receives representation substantially equivalent to that received by
paying clients, and the ethical integrity of the attorney is not compromised. Although
the procedure does not require a "brief" per se, it does satisfy the Anders requirement of
"referring" to issues that arguably support the appeal.
